Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2002

Utah v. Jim Hutchings : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Shelden R. Carter; Attorney for Appellant.
Utah Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Hutchings, No. 20020840 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4012

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

SHELDEN R CARTER (0589)
HARRIS & CARTER
Attorney for Defendant
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 375-9801
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
STATEOFUTAH,
)
)
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appellee/Plaintiff,
)
)

VS.

•

:

;

-

;

'

)

•

JIM HUTCHINGS,

'

)

)

No.: 20020840-CA

)

Appellant/Defendant.

)
—oooOooo—

THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CRIMINAL CONVICTION
ENTERED IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. THE HONORABLE J AMES
TAYLOR, TRIAL JUDGE.
PRIORITY NO. 2

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
SHELDEN R CARTER
3325 NORTH UNIVERSITY
SUITE 200
PROVO, UTAH 84604

r*Cleric ofi

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
UTAH STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg.
3325 N. University Avenue, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Phone number # 801-375-9801
Fax number #801-377-1149

SHELDEN R CARTER (0589)
HARRIS & CARTER
Attorney for Defendant
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 375-9801
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
STATE OF UTAH,
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appellee/Plaintiff,
vs.
JIM HUTCHINGS,

No.: 20020840-CA

Appellant/Defendant.
—oooOooo-

THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CRIMINAL CONVICTION
ENTERED IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. THE HONORABLE JAMES
TAYLOR, TRIAL JUDGE.
PRIORITY NO. 2

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
SHELDEN R CARTER
3325 NORTH UNIVERSITY
SUITE 200
PROVO, UTAH 84604
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
UTAH STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg.
3325 N. University Avenue, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Phone number # 801-375-9801
Fax number #801-377-1149

SHELDEN R CARTER (0589)
HARRIS & CARTER
Attorney for Defendant
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 375-9801

,

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
STATE OF UTAH,
APPELLANT'S REPLY
Appellee/Plaintiff,
BRIEF
vs.
JIM HUTCHINGS,

No.: 20022084-CA

Appellant/Defendant.
—oooOooo—

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
DETAILS OF ARGUMENT
CONCLUSION

2
8
16

ADDENDUM
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
U.C.A. 41-6-44: (1)
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test
shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08
grams or greater at the time of the test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
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influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
(iii)has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the
time of operation or actual physical control. . . .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The State claims:
(1) Utah Case law holds that an inoperable vehicle is a vehicle over which a
person can be in 'actual physical control' for the purposed of the DUI statute.

(2) Defendant cannot claim error where the defendant reportedly invited error, in
that; the defendant did not properly preserve his objection to the Court's
failure to given his requested jury instruction.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1-Utah's DUI statute specifically mandates that the vehicle driven be an
operable motor vehicle. Here the vehicle was inoperable. The State stipulated at trial that
they had no proof, at trial, that they had any evidence to suggest he was impaired at the
time of the driving. The State argues that since the defendant drove the car where it
became inoperable it is enough. This is contrary to the case holdings of Utah.
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2- The State argues that defendant invited error. The State's argument is
based on a portion of the transcript which is taken out of context. Once the entire text is
given, it is clear that the defendant did not invite error.
ARGUMENT
1.
State's

Position.
Utah Case law holds that an inoperable vehicle is a vehicle over which a person

can be in 'actual physical control'for the purposed of the Dili statute.
Defendant's

Position.

The State stipulated, at trial, that they had no proof that the defendant drove the
car off the road while under the influence of alcohol They relied on the fact that by
{

driving, the now inoperable ca,r to its resting place, an inference can be made that he
was impaired without further proof Defendant asserts that if the State is to rely on this
inference they must offer some proof to substantiate this inference of impairment.

i

Here, no evidence suggested that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol
at the time he drove the car off the road. None. The State, in their brief, cites a transcript

{

reference to circumstantial evidence suggesting that the defendant was under the
influence at this time. Appellant cannot find such. Further, this suggestion contradicts
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the State's position at trial. At trial, the State stipulated they could not prove he to be
under the influence when the car went into the gorge.
Appellant cites this court to the following discussion at trial between the
defense, State, and the trial court.
A discussion dealing with the application of Lopez v. Schwendiman
occurred on record. The trial court commented that we do not know the
particular factual scenario of Lopez

in that, we don't know if he was drunk

when he drove the car to the location where it was inoperable. The Court stated
at page 99 line 20:
The Court: So we know he was drunk when he was apprehended at the truck.
What we don't know in the facts oj: Lopez is if he was drunk when the tracks were
made. That's the point.
The State responded at page 99 line 24 stating:
Mr. Probert: Right And we don't know that here either.
The Court: Right.
Mr. Carter: And our statute requires he's actual physical control while he's under
the influence.

The trial court, the defense, and the State all agreed that the proof was lacking. No
proof existed as to his state of sobriety at the time of the alleged driving. This is based
on the following evidence.
The officer under cross-examination stated: {Starting at page 84 Line 20)
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Q. There was going to be some independent means applied to that vehicle
to get it to move.
A. (Officer Mitchell). Yes. From where it was sitting.
Q. And you don't' know the extent of what that might have been.
A. The extent it might have been was, help was called. A single person
showed up. And the occupant was waiting with the vehicle.
Q. Do you know how long that Blazer had been there?
A. I don't
Q. You obviously didn't observe the vehicle going into that area where
it came to rest.
A. No.
Q. Pretty much your observations are limited to the time at 9:15 p.m. when
you arrived at the scene to the time of the arrest at 9:50 p.m.
A. Yes.
Q. You don't have any other observations before that time of 9:50 p.m.
A. Just a dispatch that said there was a car that went off and an accident.
Q. We don't have a third party giving us any more information at all.
A. I know where you're leading. No. I tried to find out if there was a
complainant that called it in, information. There wasn't.
Q. You see Mr. Hutchings at that time. You say he doesn't have alcohol
coming from his breath.
A. No.
Q. You say it comes from his clothing or his perspiration or something of
that nature.
A. Off his person, yes.
Q. Correct.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know how much alcohol Mr. Hutchings had to drink?
A. No.
Q. Do you know how much alcohol he had before he arrived on the
scene?
. A. No.
Q. You don't know how long he had been there?
A. No.
Q. You don't know how the vehicle got there?
A. Just by the tracks, missed the curve and went over.
Q. The only thing you know is, he's about the vehicle?
A. He's in the driver seat in a vehicle. ( Transcript Page 87 Line 13)

. . . (Transcript 83 Line 15)
Q. It wasn 't going to move on its own volition or on movement? You
couldn 't urn the key, start it up, and drive it off?
a. No, you could not. (Line 18.)
The tow truck driver arrived and tried to start the car.
(Transcript Page 60 Line 14)
Q. What happened when he tried to start the vehicle?
A. It wouldn 't start.
Q. Who removed the vehicle from the scene?
A. The tow company.

The defendant's position is based on Utah statutory law, which requires the car be
operable. The trial court defined a motor vehicle to be a self-propelled vehicle intended
primarily for use and operation on the highways. See Court's Instruction 5. This
instruction is based on Utah law and was submitted to the trial court via jury instruction
by the defense. (Contrary to the State ys position in their brief the defendant hadprefiled his requestedjury instruction with the trial court. The trial court even modified
their initial instruction to conform to defendant's statement of the law. See transcript at
page 95.)
Utah statutory law (U.C.A. 41-6-1 (22)) defines a 'motor vehicle" as:
. . .every vehicle which is self propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by
electric power obtainedfrom overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails,
except vehicles moved solely by human power and motorized wheel chairs.
U.C.A. 41-6-1 (55) defines a vehicle to be:
. . .every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be
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transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used exclusively upon
stationary rails or tracks.

In contradiction to this statutory language, the State seeks support in the Lopez v.
Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1986). Lopez is not a criminal case but an
appeal from driver license suspension. As noted by the trial court, the factual scenario of
Lopez is lacking. However, the language target by the State in Lopez is:
Where, as here, circumstantial evidence permits a legitimate inference that the
car was where it was and was performing as it was because of the defendant }s
choice, it follows that the defendant was in actual physical control.
The language suggests that since the defendant had driven the car to that location
there is a legitimate inference that may be drawn. See also Richfield City v. Walker, 790
P.2d 87 (Utah App. 1990).
Here, the evidence is lacking — no evidence supports a legitimate
inference that the defendant was intoxicated at the time he drove into the gorge.
The State of Utah even conceded this point as noted above. Defendant argues
that these stipulation are binding.
The problem with the State's theory was noted by the trial court. The
Court commented at page 102 line 9.
The Court: Well, the problem I have with your argument, Mr. Probert, is that if I
have a derelict motor vehicle sitting in a wrecking yard, hasn't been operated since
memory of man, and a drunk stumbles in and sits down in the seat, under your
argument, he would be in physical control of a motor vehicle. I'm not willing to go
that far.

7
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Defendant's position is similar to the trial court. The State must make some
correlation to the actual driving of the vehicle (which is now inoperable) and the
defendant's state of impairment. The scenario presented by the trial court is one problem.
Many others exist.
What if, as here, the vehicle is in a location for an unknown time maybe even up
to a number of days. The defendant returns to the inoperable car to have a two truck pull it
away. But in the interim, he has drank to excess and slides behind the wheel. Is the person
then guilty of the DUI?
What if two persons were in the car when it was driven off the road. The
passenger is intoxicated but the driver not. The car is determined to be inoperable from thi
accident. The passenger slides behind the wheel as the officer arrives.
The State has some burden to prove that when he drove off into the gorge, he
was impaired by alcohol. Here the time the car drove off the road is unknown (hours or
days). The defendant's state of impairment is unknown No effort was made to correlate
the defendant's state of impairment when this accident (driving) occurred. The quantity of
alcohol consumed after the defendant was cut off and drove into the gorge is unknown.
The State carries the burden of proof. If they are going to rely on the defendant
driving to the location, they need give some evidence to support a legitimate inference
that he did so while impaired. If the defendant was observed by the officer within
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minutes of the accident, it may be a legitimate inference that he drove there while
impaired.
Here, the State however failed to give us any evidence to substantiate a legitimate
inference that when the defendant drove off the road he was impaired.

State's Claim- Defendant invited error.
Defendant submitted his requested instruction with supporting memorandum. The
State also submitted their own jury instruction, which is almost identical to defendants.
See "Memorandum in Reference to Defendant's Requested Instruction."—Submitted July
16, 2002 twenty days prior to trial. The trial court decided to draft its own version Yet,
somehow the State argues that the defendant invited error.
Defense Position:
The defendant had submitted his written jury instructions almost three (3) weeks
prior to trial. The Court informed counsel that the Court had drafted its own jury
instruction on 'actual physical control'. The defense thereafter sought modifications of
the Court's given instruction to enhance his defense theory without success, This does not
constitute 'inviting error.'
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Defendant objected to the Court's given instruction throughout the trial court's
discussion. Defendant particularized his objection to the Court's instruction
contemporaneous with his motion to dismiss. Seepage 92 line 4-10. The Court had
informed the parties that the Court was going to use its own instruction and not theirs.
See Page 91 line 2. Further, contrary to the provisions of Rule 19 (e) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the trial court did not provide an opportunity to express objections
but simply advised that the Court would give the Court's instruction thereby rejecting the
defendant's and State's.
The trial court then asked for input referencing the 'actual physical
control' instruction given by the trial court. Page 97 line 2. The State here
argues that defense counsel's objection was inviting error.
The defense stated referencing the Court's given instruction:
Mr. Carter: If they're going to rely upon the driver before the vehicle
becomes inoperable, they're required to show some connection at that time
to the defendant's intoxication. . . .
Page 97 line 17-20.

Mr. Carter: That's my point. There's no correlation here. We're limited
on our findings regarding time sequence. We're limited on our alcohol
consumption sequence. We don't have any connection to the actual
driving. From my argument, they can't convict him of actual physical
control sitting as the officer finds him. They have to use the statement
before to surmise that maybe he was intoxicated at that time. Page 99
line 5-1L
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Mr. Carter: My argument is, that's the essence of the statute. You've got
to have both. As you said in your (State's) opening argument, you have
to do the dot to dot. Page 100 line 18-20.

Court: .. . Again, we're inferring. We're reading between the lines. What
they're saying there is, they don't want to allow a drunken driver who
wrecks his car to then not be able to be convicted because he wrecked the
car. Page 101 line 4-7.
Mr. Carter. And we agree. Page 101 line 8.
Further discussion continues and the Court decides to move on and then
asks for input on other instructions. Seepage 103 lines 1 -3. Mr. Carter then
advises that the defendant had not elected to testify or not at this point. Page 103
line 4. The State wants to discuss further the 'actual physical control' instruction
and the Court advises that the Court has already ruled and wants to move on.
Page 103 line 12. The State persists and now wants to include hypertechnical
verbiage. Page 103 line 14-16. The Court then asks defense if they have any
objection to this technical addition and the defense states "No. That's fine." Page
103 line 25.
Defense counsel, although specifically proposing his version of 'actual
physical control' was advised by the Court that it would not be given and the
Court had drafted a different instruction and ask counsel's input. Defendant did
not waive his objection. However, the defense did try, without success, to have
the Court's given instruction modified.
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The State had argued that the defense instruction had raised a list of factors to be
considered as set out in Richfield City v. Walker, supra. The State sought to argue that
further additional indicators should be added to the list set out in Walker.
Defense counsel suggested that he desired the Walker list be given as per his
instruction but recognized that the Court had already ruled. Defense counsel stated:
. . .Walker just gave you a nine and didn't say it was a full list anyway. You know,
I wouldn't mind see Walker in there. But I think the court has ruled. Let's move
on. Page 104 Line 19.

The trial court then commented on the issue of a checklist advising that the Court
was going to avoid giving a checklist and wanted to look at the 'totality of the
circumstances'. Page 104 Line 23.
The State argues that counsel invited error. Appellant disagrees.
The State argues:
"After deciding that issue, the trial court asked, "Is there anything further we
need to discuss on this instruction? " (R. 154:103) Defendant responded, " I don't
think I have a problem with anything else " (R. 154:103) ". Seepage 15 of State's
Brief
The State misleads. This phrase noted immediately above is taken out of
context. The State fails to report the entire text. In full, it reads:
Court:.. • Is there anything further that we need to discuss on this
instruction? Is there any argument or question about any of the other
instructions?
Mr. Carter: We haven't elected at this point whether the defendant is
going to testify. Want that to be optional. I don't think I have a problem
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with anything else. (Emphasis Added indicated sentences eliminated by the
State in their brief)
Once read within in the entire text in full, it is clear that the Court asked for some
input on other instructions. The defendant advised that the instruction dealing with the
defendant testifying or not maybe unnecessary since the defendant may not testify at all—
he had not decided. Then the defense notes no other difficulties with any other
instructions.

MANIFEST ERROR
Further, it does not matter. It is 'manifest error' not to define the elements of the
offense. Here, the Court refused both the State's and defense's instruction and created its
own. The Court here failed to follow the applicable case law in defining 'actual physical
control' and chooses to go alone.
In State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991) the Court pronounced:
The jury must be instructed with respect to all the legal elements that it must find
to convict of the crime charged, and the absence of such an instruction is
reversible error as a matter of law. Laine, 618 P.2d at 35. In State v. Roberts, 711
P.2d 235 (Utah 1985), we stated, 'The general rule is that an accurate instruction
upon the basic elements of an offense is essential. Failure to so instruct constitutes
reversible error." Id. at 239 (Utah 1985) (citing Laine, 618 P.2d at 35). See also
State v. Harmon, 712P.2d291, 292 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); State v. Reedy, 681
P.2d 1251, 1252 (Utah 1984). Thus, the failure to give this instruction can never
be harmless error.
The complete absence of an elements instruction on a crime
charged is an error we review to avoid manifest injustice. See
Utah R.Crim.P. 19(c); State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 81 (Utah
1983); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107, 65 S.Ct.
1031, 1038, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89,
60 P.2d 952, 958-59 (1936); People v. Wickersham, 32 Cal.3d 307,
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650 P.2d 311, 326-27, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 451-52 (1982) (en
banc). Cf. State v. Bell, 563P.2dl86, 187 (Utah 1977). It
follows that even though Jones failed to object to the lack of an
elements instruction when the instructions were given, the trial
court's complete failure to give an elements instruction on
aggravated kidnapping is clear error and requires reversal of the
conviction and remand for a new trial on that charge.

Here, the trial court failed to advise the jury of the legal definition of 'actual
physical control'. It is the essential elements of this offense.

As set out in State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), the test of whether an
unpreserved objection may be reviewed under the 'manifest injustice ' exception is as
follows:
. .. First, the error must be "plain" or "manifest." This is sometimes termed an
"obviousness" requirement. After examining the record, an appellate court must be
able to say "that it should have been obvious to a trial court that it was committing
error." Second, the error must be of sufficient magnitude that it affects the
substantial rights of a party. In other words, applying the standard we explained in
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d at 919, the appellant must show a reasonable likelihood
that absent the error, the outcome below would have been more favorable.
Here, the trial court chooses to create its own instruction and deviate from
established precedent. The error is obvious. There was a conscious choice to avoid
precedent as acknowledged by instructions submitted by both the State and defense.
Further, the defense argues that a different result would have occurred if the Court
would have submitted the instructions tendered by the defense. Under the formula of
Richfield City v. Walker, supra, a person should have the apparent ability to move the
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vehicle. There would be no danger of the defendant driving the car since it could not be
moved. Absent such a showing, the defendant would be entitled to an acquittal.

CONCLUSION
The States failure to correlate the defendant's driving to a state of impairment is
fatal. If the State is to rely on a legitimate inference, they must tender some evidence to
support such an inference. Here, they did not do so.

Secondly, once the defendant's comments are read in full text, it is obvious that he
did not invite error. The trial court had refused to give his instruction which represented
•1

years of case precedent and created its own. The trial court's instruction failed to define

the offense of being in 'actual physical control of the car while impaired'.

Dated this 2 N D day of August, 2003.
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Addendum to Brief
1. Portions of the transcript with highlights.
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

A.

A single person showed up. And the occupant was waiting with

Like I said, I've been policing for so long that when

1 get a circumstance such as this or somebody calls for help

the vehicle.

and it's not a tow truck and they say there's no damage to the

Q.

We're conjecturing what might or might not have been.

vehicle, my attitude is that that vehicle can move. It might

A.

Actually, his father did show up on scene, and the

be out of gas. There's some reason. It might be a temporary

called somebody to pull him out, the vehicle was going to move
when somebody came there, either with a tow strap •- he stayed
with the vehicle, and the vehicle was going to move from that

A.

Without a tow truck because it was never called

A.

No, based on the occupant saying there was no damage

to the vehicle.
Q.

Do you remember when we had our conversation before

at a hearing where you advised me that the vehicle was

spot without a tow truck.
Eventually at some time?

Did you check out any further what was wrong with

that vehicle?

vehicle said there was no damage to the vehicle. When he

Q.

single person as occupant was waiting for his help to arrive.
Q.

thing. It might be a permanent thing. The occupant of the

inoperable; it was not going to be moved?
A.

except by me.

I said it wouldn't start, if I remember right, on the

pretrial.

You and I aren't going to argue about semantics.

Q.

Prelim.

Someone might have called the tow truck and pulled it out

A.

It didn't start. I think the question was, the tow

Q.

independent of your call, correct?
A.

truck came and got it, and the semantic was that I called the
tow truck and not the occupant.

The fact of the matter is, he called his father to

come and help him.
Q.

There was going to be some independent means applied

to that vehicle to get it to move.
A.

Yes. From where it was sitting.

2a

Q.

And you just don't know the extent of what that might

24

have been.

25

A.

Q.

Do you know how long that Blazer had been there?

A.

I don't.

Q.

You obviously didn't observe the vehicle going into

that area where it came to rest.

The extent it might have been was, help was called.

A.

No.

j

Q.

Pretty much your observations are limited to the time

|

at 9:15 p.m. when you arrived at the scene to the time of the

84

1 I arrest, about 9:50 p.m.
2

A.

Yes.

3 I

Q.

You just don't have any other observations before

4
5 J
6
7
8
9

off and an accident.
Q.

There wasn't.

14
15
16

No.
Do you know how much alcohol he had before you

No.
Q.

I know where you're leading. No. I tried to find

11

Q.

A.

arrived on the scene?

information at all?
A.

Do you know how much alcohol Mr. Hutchings had to

Q.

We don't have a third party giving us any more

out if there was a complainant that called it in, information.

13

Q.
drink?

j u s t a dispatch that said there was a car that went

10

12

it's spilled on them, it's a different smell.

that time of 9:50 p.m.?
A.

85

You see Mr. Hutchings at that time. You say he

doesn't have alcohol coming from his breath.

You don't know how long he had been there?

A.

No.

Q.

You don't know how the vehicle got there?

A.

Just by the tracks. Missed the curve and went over.

Q.

The only thing you know is, he's about a vehicle -

A.

He's in the driver's seat in a vehicle.

A.

No.

Q.

Keys are on the passenger's side?

Q.

You say it comes from his clothing or his

A.

Passenger's front seat.

Q.

The vehicle will not start?

perspiration or something of that nature.

17

A.

Off his person, yes.

A.

I only knew that after the tow truck came.

18

Q-

Correct?

Q.

And it's going to require some independent means, a

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Do you know if any alcohol was spilled on him or

21
22

third party, to help it move some direction or whatever.
A.

anything of that nature?
A.

Before I called for the tow truck, yeah, he told me

that he had walked off and actually called his father to come
and help him.

There's a difference between fresh alcohol and

23

consumed alcohol. Over the years, it's pretty prevalent when

MR. CARTER: Nothing further. Thank you.

24

somebody has been drinking and they breathe on you. You ca

THE COURT: Mr. Probert?

25

smell it on their breath versus coming off their body. If

86

87

this physical control instruction?
MR. CARTER: That would be fine, Judge, but I'd like

1

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. I've got a vehicle, tracks,

2

off the road, someone who appears to be impaired. I'm

to do something on the record. I'd like to move for a

3

satisfied there's enough.

dismissal at this point. I don't think the State has shown my

4

Mr. Probert, response to his motion to dismiss?

client to be in actual physical control. I have actually

5

MR. PROBERT: Yes, Your Honor. The State would argue

formalized it by this memo, if I may approach. I faxed a copy

6

that the law in the state of Utah is as described in the

of that to Mr. Probert this morning. I believe he has it.

7

decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Lopez versus

For the Court's information, I think it just basically resets

8

Schwendiman, which adopted the decision in State versus

out my arguments on the instructions as well. I don't think

9

Smelter, the Washington Supreme Court decision. I would like

it adds a lot.

10

to just read a short quotation from Lopez:

THE: COURT: Your argument is that if the car wouldn't
go, it couldn't be physically controlled?
MR. CARTER: Keys are out of the ignition, on the

11

"Utah's statute provides for the arrest of one 'in

12

actual physical control' of the vehicle while under the

13

influence of alcohol and/or drugs. That requirement was

passenger's side. He's behind the wheel of an inoperable

14

intended by our legislature to protect public safety and

vehicle. We do not think that fits within the definition of

15

apprehend the drunken driver before he or she strikes and may

actual physical control.

16

not be construed to exclude those whose vehicles are presently

Just for purposes of the record, on the issue of your

17

immobile because of mechanical trouble." That's page 791 of

18

the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in relation to that

only identification of the vehicle being down there; there

19

case.

wasn't any information relayed regarding the driving. The

20

ruling on the corpus delecti, at that time I thought there was

only relationship to driving was the defendant's comments as

21

reported by the officer that some lady cut him off and forced

22

him down into that area.
THE COURT: Just to respond to that, I was satisfied
that there was enough of an inference. Doesn't have to be

THE COURT: That's in Lopez?
MR. PROBERT: That's Lopez. I do have a photostat
copy of that case if Your Honor wants to look at it.

23

THE COURT: I have it in front of me.

24

MR. PROBERT: In that case, Your Honor is aware of

25

the factual situation, and I think that the factual situation
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is strongly paralleled in this case. In State versus Smelter,

I think the Lopez case is almost directly on point. That's a

the Court said that, "The focus should not be narrowly upon

case with an immobile vehicle with tracks leading to the

the mechanical condition of the car when it comes to rest" --

vehicle. Lopez was presumably convicted. Although it wasn't

clearly, here we have a vehicle that came to rest •- "but upon

a criminal case, it was an appeal of the denial of a driver's

the status of its occupant and the nature of the authority he

license or whatever. The rule of law is the same, although

or she exerted over the vehicle in arriving at the place from

the burden of proof is different. I think it's pretty close

which, by virtue of its inoperability, it can no longer move."

to on point. I'm going to deny the motion.
Now what I had done on the physical control statute.

Then the Court went on: "Where, as here, circumstantial
evidence permits a legitimate inference that the car was where

First of all, if you've got your instructions, if you'll take

it was and was performing as it was because of the defendant's

a look at page 5 of 25 of the instructions, I put in a

choice, it follows that the defendant was in actual physical

definition of motor vehicle. I did it late in the day, and I

control."

took it from the wrong chapter. Mr. Carter has submitted a
The State would argue that the fact that the vehicle

definition of motor vehicle which is from the correct chapter.
MR. CARTER: Wait a minute. I want to hear that

was inoperable is rendered irrelevant by the decisions in
Lopez versus Schwendiman and State versus Smelter. The fact

again.
THE COURT: You submitted the one from the correct

that the vehicle is inoperable is not a consideration which
chapter.

the supreme court has indicated is to be taken into
consideration, as I understand the decision in Lopez. The

MR. CARTER: Thank you.

statute "may not be construed to exclude those whose vehicles

THE COURT: But unless this is a trolley car, you had
a lot of language there that didn't really apply. I think

are presently immobile because of mechanical trouble."
The State would submit it on that basis.

what's happened is, the definition 1 took is from 4 1 - 1 , and

THE COURT: Mr. Carter, want to be heard further?

the one you took is from 41-6. They talk about applying to

MR. CARTER: I assume the Court has read my briefs.

chapters. There's a lot of language in the 41-6 one that
doesn't apply in the case. The principle difference is -•

I differ with that argument.
THE COURT: I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss.

QA

they both talk about a self-propelled vehicle. ! think the
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4 1 - l ( a ) definition then talks about intended for use and

MR. PROBERT: Yes.

operation on a road. That's the instruction I used. And I

THE COURT: The next instruction is page 6 of 25.

think the one that's later doesn't say that. It just says any

That's the physical control. I'll tell you, the genesis of

self-propelled vehicle.

this instruction is that this is essentially the instruction
that will be included in the model criminal instructions for

Candidly, I have a problem with that definition.
It's not in this case, but, I mean, what about these kids that

Utah. They haven't been published yet, but I have a set.

are rodding around on these skateboards with a little motor on

They're out for comment right now. With the exception that I

them? Under the one section, it's a motor vehicle. Under the

added in the last paragraph, the last paragraph comes directly

other, it i s n ' t I don't think anybody in their right mind is

from the Lopez case.
MR. PROBERT: It comes from the Smelter case.

going to be putting on the blue lights and trying to chase

THE COURT: Smelter as cited in Lopez. The portion

down a kid on a skateboard. Doesn't apply to this case.
MR. CARTER: Let me clear that up for you.

that Mr. Probert read to us, the quote that Mr. Probert read

THE COURT: Doesn't apply to this case. I think what

to us, from Lopez is the following paragraph. What I did is

you're concerned about, Mr. Carter, is, you're able to argue

took it right out of the case. It's my view that the supreme

it's not a vehicle because it's not self-propelled. Is that

court adopted that by approval. But I'll hear you as to how

fair?

you think it ought to be worded.
MR. CARTER: If they're going to rely upon the

MR. CARTER: That may be where I'm going.

driving before the vehicle becomes inoperable, they're

THE COURT: I think that language is the same in

required to show some connection at that time to the

either case.

defendant's intoxication. I think you have a reference in

MR. CARTER: I don't think either one hurts me. I

that to that instruction, but it's not real clear. I think it

think this is fine.
THE COURT: Are you comfortable with this definition?

ought to be more clear. If they're going to rely on some
driving beforehand, then they need to correlate the

MR. PROBERT: I'm comfortable with the incorrect

intoxication to the previous driving.

definition.
THE COURT: It's a vehicle so it fits either one.

THE COURT: You're talking about a situation where.
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as a hypothetical, subject drives a car down the road; he's

is, we don't have enough facts to know if it was dicta or the

involved in an accident; car becomes disabled; he then begins

facts of the case because we don't know if there was a

to drink, so that the intoxication occurs thereafter. The

correlation between the time of intoxication and the time of

question is, under the language of Smelter and of Lopez, is he

control in Lopez.

nevertheless guilty under that language because what this case

MR. CARTER: That's my point. There's no correlation

says is that if it's inoperable because of his control, it's

here. We're limited on our findings regarding time sequence.

irrelevant? That's Mr. Probert's argument, I think, that

We're limited on our alcohol consumption sequence. We don't

under that circumstance, if he's in physical control of the

have any connection to the actual driving. From my argument,

hunk of junk, if that's what it is once it becomes inoperable,

they can't convict him of actual physical control sitting as

but he's in control of whatever used to be a vehicle, and it

the officer finds him. They have to use the statement before

used to be a vehicle, under my hypothetical, because he

to surmise that maybe he was intoxicated at that time.

wrecked it.

THE COURT: Mr. Probert, do you want to be heard

Your argument is, if the intoxication occurred

further?

thereafter, he can't be under physical control while

MR. PROBERT: If I could direct you to Paragraph 6 in

intoxicated. I think Mr. Probert's argument is, it doesn't

Lopez, the Court there says, "The trial court here found that

matter. He caused it to become inoperable. Therefore, he

there were tire tracks leading up to the vehicle, that the

remains in physical control of it. And if the intoxication

vehicle had to have reached its point of rest 'apparently on

and the physical control coincide, there's a violation.

its own power,' and that Lopez had failed the field sobriety
tests."

Is that fairly stated?
MR, PROBERT: That's correct, Judge. And, of course,

THE COURT: So we know he was drunk when he was

the supreme court in Lopez versus Schwendiman raised the very

apprehended at the truck. What we don't know in the facts of

issue that if the defendant has rendered the vehicle

Lopez is if he was drunk when the tracks were made. That's

inoperable in a collision, he's not allowed to escape the

the point.

prosecution for DUI.

MR. PROBERT: Right. And we don't know that here

THE COURT: They raised it. The dilemma they have

98

either.
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THE COURT: Right.

1

control. To hold otherwise could conceivably allow an

MR. CARTER: And our statute requires he's actual

2

intoxicated driver whose vehicle was rendered inoperable in a

3

collision to escape prosecution."

physical control while he's under the influence.

4

Again, we're inferring. We're reading between the

not necessary that the vehicle be operable in order for him to

5

lines. What they're saying there is, they don't want to allow

THE COURT: Well, he's in physical control if it's

be physical control. What I'm wondering about is the language

6

a drunken driver who wrecks his car to then not be able to be

that I put in this instruction that says, "It is also possible

7

convicted because he wrecked his car.

for a person to be in physical control of a motor vehicle when

8

MR. CARTER: And we agree.

the vehicle is disabled if the problem from the vehicle arose

9

THE COURT: And I think that's what it says. So I'm

from the act or behavior of the actor" - that's right out of

10

going to leave the phrase that I have added in, and that is

Smelter -- "and the jury can conclude that the disabling

11

that you've got to show that the intoxication is reasonably

action is contemporaneous with the intoxication of the

12

contemporaneous with his disabling of the car, although the

Defendant." That phrase is something I added. I presume you

13

fact that the car is there after being disabled does not make

14

it impossible for him to be convicted. So there's evidence

object to that, Mr. Probert; is that correct?

15

here from which it's very possible for this jury to conclude

burden on the State to -• seems to be creating an element of

16

that he was driving the car when it went off the road.

the offense which is not in the statute.

17

There's no evidence at all -- we don't know why the car was

18

disabled, although we know that it was; he was in it; and the

the statute. You've got to have both. As you said in your

19

tow truck driver couldn't start it. That's all the evidence

opening argument, you have to do the dot to dot.

20

shows.

MR. PROBERT: Yes, I do, because that seems to put a

MR. CARTER: My argument is, that's the essence of

THE COURT: I'm looking directly at the quote from

21

MR. PROBERT: Could I say something?

Smelter. What it says is, "Where, as here, circumstantial

22

THE COURT: Yes.

evidence permits a legitimate inference that the car was where

23

MR. PROBERT: Judge, in the hypothetical scenario

it was and was performing as it was because of the defendant's

24. that the defendant in this situation goes away and drinks a

choice, it follows that the defendant was in actual physical

25 | considerable amount of alcohol after he has wrecked the
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vehicle and comes back and is sitting in the driver's seat

Is there anything further that we need to discuss on

with the keys, the vehicle is inoperable. If the vehicle had

this instruction? Is there any argument or question about any

been just flooded and was unable to be operated because he had

of the other instructions?
MR. CARTER: We haven't elected at this point whether

tried too hard and had flooded the engine so it wouldn't go,
when he came back, by that time, he was intoxicated. The

the defendant is going to testify. Want that to be optional.

statute is designed to stop him from driving off in that

I don't think I have a problem with anything else.
THE COURT: I've given the horizontal gaze nystagmus

vehicle. The fact that the vehicle is inoperable does not

instruction, which I think is approved by the supreme court.

make him not liable.

Mr. Probert, any other questions?

THE COURT: Weil, the problem I have with your

MR. PROBERT: I did, Judge, in relation to the

argument, Mr. Probert, is that if I have a derelict motor
vehicle sitting in a wrecking yard, hasn't been operated since

instruction that we've been discussing.
THE COURT: I've ruled. I don't intend to take

memory of man, and a drunk stumbles in and sits down in the
seat, under your argument, he would be in physical control of

further argument on it. Let's move on.
MR. PROBERT: Well, there seems to be some words ieft

a motor vehicle. I'm not willing to go that far.
MR. PROBERT: Well, I don't think you have to go that

out. I'm sorry to ask you about this. In the first sentence,
I think you've left out the words "while under the influence."

far.

MR. CARTER: That's a super-hypertechnical reading of

THE COURT: I think you have to show that the car is
disabled because of his agency. And it makes no sense unless

it. To me, it's not a big deal. I think the essence of it is

the intoxication is also contemporaneous with that behavior.

clear.

MR. PROBERT: Well, would Your Honor tell me whether
the person in the scenario that I have created is liable under

THE COURT: You want to add the words "under the
influence" after the word "individual?"
MR. PROBERT: Of alcohol and/or drugs or of alcohol,

the DUI statute? He's sitting in the vehicle. He has the

if you prefer.

keys. He's intoxicated.
THE COURT: No, i won't answer the question because

THE COURT; You object to that, Mr. Carter?
MR. CARTER: No. That's fine.

it's not the facts before us.
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MR. PROBERT: I also had another point which I hadn*

circumstances. I didn't draft this language. This is the
model instruction that's been prepared and to be approved in

been able to address at this point
THE COURT: Let me finish this. Just a minute.

ail courts in the state. The reason it's drafted somewhat

MR. PROBERT: Mr. Carter raised the question of City

vague is because it's a totality-of-the-circumstances test.

of Richfield versus Walker, and he mentioned the factors that

They don't need to go through and check off each item.
But having said that, in the second paragraph after

are mentioned in that case as being relevant factors to the

where it says "you may consider," if I added the words "the

discussion of whether or not somebody is in actual physical
control. In this instruction, it talks about three factors

totality of the circumstances, including but not limited to,"

which the jury may consider. There are other factors which

would that satisfy? Then you can argue whatever circumstances

were specifically mentioned in Walker, such as how the vehicle

you think there are in this case that justify the appropriate

got to the spot where it was, which are not mentioned there.

conclusion.
MR. PROBERT: I would ask Your Honor to include the

This seems to me to be a rather vague statement of what the

words "how the vehicle got there."

jury is supposed to do with the information when it says it
may consider whether the defendant occupied the driver's

MR. CARTER: That's very well addressed below, Judge.

position. That just seems to me that it doesn't cover all the

THE COURT: I think it's addressed below.
Mr. Carter, anything further? You object to that

conditions. It doesn't say whether or not any of these is
verbiage?

determinative or whether it is a fullness of the factors which

MR. CARTER: No.

are relevant.

THE COURT: Other objections?

MR. CARTER: Walker just gave you a nine and didn't

MR. PROBERT: I have one other instruction that I ask

say it was a full list anyway. You know, I wouldn't mind
seeing Walker in there. But I think the Court has ruled.

the Court to include which the Court has not included. The

Let's move on.

State submits that there should be some instruction in the

THE COURT: Well, the problem we have is and what I'

instructions to the jury about the refusal to submit to a
test.

going to avoid doing is creating a checklist because the law
is clear that they're to consider the totality of the

THE COURT: You get to mention it. Do you want me to

104

105

emphasize it? I think you can argue it. Why do you need an

going to be called today. But I did want to include an

instruction?

instruction in relation to bias.

MR. PROBERT: Well, ! think that the jury may wonder

MR. CARTER: I thought the Court addressed that.

what the significance of that is and what they're able to do

THE COURT: I think that's in there.

with that information, that he refused the test.

MR. PROBERT: I couldn't recall if it was.

THE COURT: Is there a legal significance?

MR. CARTER: Page 20 of 25: You are the sole judges

MR. PROBERT: Well, I suppose the information has
already been before the jury.

of all questions of fact, weight, and any of the testimony you
may ••

THE COURT: It's a factual conclusion, and the

MR. PROBERT: That's fine.

evidence has been presented to them. You can argue it. You

THE COURT: That's there. That's in the stocks.

can have them infer whatever they think they should infer or

Anything else?

should appropriately infer. But I don't think it's a matter

MR. PROBERT: No.

of law that they must conclude "A" or "B" or that they must --

MR. CARTER: No.
THE COURT: Let's take about five. Gather

MR. PROBERT: It isn't. It just gives them the
option to make a decision about what weight they're going to

yourselves, and come back in. What we'll do is start with the
question from the juror, then allow each of you to follow up

give to it.
THE COURT: I think it's a factual argument.

on that with the officer. Then Mr. Carter can go ahead.

MR. PROBERT: I think it's a question of weight that
they should apply.

(Brief recess is taken.)
THE COURT: Officer, if I can have you come back up

THE COURT: Then they give it what weight they feel
they want to give it. I don't think it requires a further

and take the stand. Apparently we have some questions.
Counsel, come on up.

instruction.

(Bench conference is held.)

MR. PROBERT: The other question I had was, I haven't

THE COURT: Officer, three questions. 1*11 give you

had time to check this out against the instructions that you

all three, allow you to respond and then allow the attorneys

gave me because I didn't know there were familial witnesses

to follow up if they want.
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